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This paper examines the optimal design of climate change policies in the context 
where governments want to encourage the private sector to undertake significant 
immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the carbon taxes and 
other environmental policies that could in principle stimulate such investment will be 
imposed over a very long future.  The conventional claim by environmental 
economists is that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce firms to 
undertake optimal investment. However this argument requires governments to be 
able to commit to these future taxes, and it is far from clear that governments have 
this degree of commitment.  We assume instead that governments cannot commit, and 
so both they and the private sector have to contemplate the possibility of there being 
governments in power in the future that give different (relative) weights to the 
environment.  We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric 
effect.  Compared to the situation where governments can commit it increases the 
incentive of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces 
the incentive of the private sector to invest.  Consequently governments may need to 
use additional policy instruments – such as R&D subsidies – to stimulate the required 
investment. 
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Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments 
Cannot Commit 
 
 
1.   Introduction 
 
The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change -  Stern (2007) -   has argued 
powerfully for strong early action to combat climate change.  In particular the report 
argues for early investment equivalent to 1% of GDP forever   – later updated to 2% -  
in discovering and introducing new cleaner technologies and other forms of 
mitigation activity that will limit the ultimate rise in temperature.   This is contrasted 
with potential losses equivalent to at least 5% of GDP forever from doing nothing.  
The Review notes that climate change takes place in a global economy with many 
distortions and consequently advocates a range of policies required to bring about the 
required investment, including carbon pricing through a mix of emission taxes and 
carbon trading and policies designed to accelerate both innovation and adoption of 
new low-emission technologies. The Review also emphasizes that since such policies 
will have impacts over a long time horizon, the inter-temporal evaluation of such 
policies needs to consider how society should evaluate two key factors: the substantial 
risks that climate change may pose for future generations, and how these risks might 
affect some of the poorest people in the world. 
 
The Stern Review has had a critical reception from some leading economists – e.g. 
Dasgupta (2007), Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007) – mostly focusing on the 
approach to inter-temporal policy evaluation, though this has not always led to a 
serious questioning of the policy conclusions  – Weitzman (2007). Stern (2008) has 
given a robust defence of his approach to inter-temporal policy evaluation, noting that 
climate change, and policies to deal with it, do not have marginal impacts on the 
economy and take place in a global economy with many distortions. In such a context, 
Stern (2008) re-emphasises that the framework for conducting inter-temporal policy 
evaluation needs to consider how society will manage the very substantial risks from 
climate change and so such evaluation needs to be considered from first principles.  
 
In this paper we elaborate on another feature of the Stern Review which has received 
less attention, although it is linked to a particular aspect of evaluating future risk. As 
we have noted, the Stern Review argues strongly for the use of a range of policy 
instruments, including both carbon pricing and policies to stimulate environmental 
R&D. This is in contrast with recommendations that come from more standard 
environmental economic modeling which is grounded in a framework in which a 
single government chooses a time-path of policy instruments maximizing a welfare 
function over an infinite horizon.  Within such a framework environmental policy 
instruments such as emissions/carbon taxes play a dual function:  they induce the 
optimal level of emissions in every period, but they also give firms incentives to 
undertaken investment in R&D etc that will produce cleaner technologies and so 
lower the taxes they will have to face in the future. In this stylized framework, the 
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major conclusion is that environmental policy instruments alone4 are sufficient to 
support the optimal R&D investment, output and emission paths.   
 
Of course it is widely recognized that one reason why this simple argument breaks 
down is that there are multiple market failures, and in particular as well as the 
environmental externality failure there are failures in the market for R&D5. There is a 
large literature on how environmental policies and R&D policies interact in such a 
second-best world (e.g. Jaffee, Newell and Stavins (2003) for an excellent survey). 
This second-best argument is part of the justification given in the Stern Review for 
deploying a range of both environmental and R&D policy instruments.  
 
In this paper we wish to focus on another weakness of the conventional economic 
analysis, which is that it pre-supposes that current governments can commit to tax 
policies into the far distant future, and this violates a basic principle of political 
decision-making which is that current governments cannot tie the hands of future 
governments.  Of course this need not matter if future governments were just like the 
current government, and, in particular, placed exactly the same weight on 
environmental considerations relative to other issues such as growth and employment 
as did the current government.  But the lack of commitment matters if we take 
seriously the idea that future governments can have different objectives from the 
current government.   
 
So even if the current government announces the taxes that it would like to impose in 
the future, when firms are contemplating the investment decisions they are making 
they need to take into account the possibility that future governments may place a 
greater or smaller (relative) weight on environmental issues and hence on the taxes 
they might impose. The Stern Review notes that “Lack of certainty over the future 
pricing of the carbon externality will reduce the incentive to innovate”, and this lack 
of credibility in future government policies provides a rationale (additional to the 
second-best market failure argument) for why carbon pricing alone will be 
insufficient to induce optimal R&D and why R&D policy is also required6.  
 
But of course this uncertainty about possible future environmental policies affects the 
current government as well. It is conceivable that the uncertainty about the policies of 
future governments which deters firms from making R&D investments would also 
deter current governments from undertaking policies to induce such investments. So 
the question we want to address is what policies should the current government 
implement with respect to R&D investment when it recognizes that future 
governments may implement different policies from those that it would choose if it 
could commit and when it recognizes that firms also face this policy uncertainty 
which will affect their investment intentions.   
 
So while the Stern Review identifies the importance of commitment issues with 
respect to future environmental pricing policies, and that this would make it desirable 
                                                 
4 This is consistent with the conventional neoclassical notion of innovation being induced by changes 
in relative prices (Jaffee, Newell and Stavins (2003)), in this case by changes in relative prices resulting 
from environmental policies. 
5 Standard failures include capital market failures,  appropriability problems, ‘rent-stealing’ – see Jaffee 
et al (2003) for a survey. 
6 See Stern (2007) pp 393 and 399. 
 3
for current governments to also act on environmental R&D policies, it does not 
provide an analysis that ensures that current governments will have an incentive to 
take such action.7 That is the purpose of this paper.   
 
Now there have been a number of studies of the nature of government policies in a 
variety of policy contexts that contrast the outcomes when governments can and 
cannot commit.8   In these studies commitment and lack of commitment are modeled 
as different move structures in a game between governments and firms undertaking an 
investment.  If the government can commit it announces a single value of its policy 
instrument, which for purposes of discussion we will take to be an emission tax rate9, 
before firms make their investment decision; whereas if governments cannot commit 
the tax rate is set after firms have made their investment decision, and so will depend 
on the investment decision that is made.  Compared to the situation where 
governments can commit, lack of commitment brings the advantage of a more 
responsive policy – effectively a wider range of policy instruments – but has the 
disadvantage that investment decisions will now be distorted by the desire to 
influence tax policy.  So there may be circumstances where the inability to commit is 
welfare superior to the situation where governments can commit. 
 
What these studies do not explain is why, if the government does have the ability to 
commit, it can only commit to a single tax rate and cannot commit to a tax policy 
whereby it announces in advance what taxes will be set conditional on the investment 
decisions made by firms.  This combines the benefits of having more instruments with 
those of non-manipulability and is certainly welfare superior10. In this paper we avoid 
these issues by assuming that if the government can commit it can commit to a policy 
in which the taxes it will set will depend on the R&D investment decision that is 
made.  
 
An approach that comes close to that pursued here is that by Boyer and Laffont 
(1999). They analyse the trade-off that can arise if future governments have better 
information about environmental damage costs, but may also attach different weights 
to environmental damages; how far would a current government want to restrict what 
future governments might do (‘tying their hands’) by mandating that the future 
government sets environmental taxes equal to expected damage costs. This would 
prevent the effects of ‘capture’ but at the expense of limiting a future government’s 
ability to respond to better information. Similar issues arise in the context of 
environmental policies being taken by different levels of government (e.g. EU / 
member state; national / local)  - see for example  Johal and Ulph (2002,2003).   
 
For simplicity, in this paper we have ignored the issue of future governments getting 
better information about damage costs11.  So in the context of the Boyer and Laffont 
                                                 
7 Of course there are many other policy challenges in tackling climate change – the need for 
international agreement, the issue of stock externalities (and hence the appropriate time-path of carbon 
taxes), and, as mentioned in footnote 11 below, the issue of learning etc.  These undoubtedly interact 
with the commitment issue, but for simplicity we have ignored these. 
8 See for example Leahy and Neary (1996, 2000),  Petrakis & Xepapadeas (1999, 2000).   
9 Or other policy instrument 
10 See Ulph and Ulph (2001) for a demonstration 
11 We have analysed some of the implications of this in Ulph & Ulph (1997).  If a government can 
commit then it can address this issue by announcing today a tax policy which sets out what tax rates it 
intends to set in the future conditional on what it learns about the seriousness of the climate change 
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analysis, a current government would always want to use its powers to commit future 
governments to set the emission taxes the current government would want to set. But 
what Boyer and Laffont fail to explain is how governments can tie the hand of future 
governments – i.e. can commit.  The issue we address is what policies a current 
government should pursue when there are no constitutional powers that allow it to 
prevent future governments setting whatever emission taxes they would want to set. 
The point we make is that governments may still have a weak indirect ability to 
influence future tax-setting policy through their ability to influence the investment 
decisions of the private sector particularly if that investment takes an irreversible form 
of something like R&D.  The issue we are concerned with is that in addition to setting 
environmental taxes to control future emissions and outputs, there is an additional 
policy issue of inducing the appropriate level of R&D investment.  
 
As noted above there are many reasons why governments will want to employ 
environmental R&D policies in addition to environmental taxes.  To highlight the role 
that lack of commitment plays in driving governments to use such policies, we 
develop a framework in which all the standard features that would justify 
environmental R&D policies are absent12.   We show the following: 
• If the government can commit to future emission taxes, then it can induce 
what it regards as the optimal R&D investment.  If the scale of investment is 
sufficiently low it may be sufficient to commit to a single tax rate – that which 
it will impose conditional on the R&D investment taking place.  Otherwise if 
the scale of investment is very large then it needs to commit to a policy and 
use the threat of setting a much higher tax rate if firms fail to invest to induce 
the optimal investment. 
• However if the government cannot commit then this has a very asymmetric 
effect on the incentives of the private sector and the government to have the 
investment undertaken. As the Stern Review recognised, lack of commitment 
reduces the incentive of the private sector to invest – essentially because it 
introduces an intrinsic degree of risk aversion to the incentive. However, lack 
of commitment increases the incentive for the government to have investment 
undertaken – essentially because having a cleaner technology in place reduces 
the sensitivity of its view of welfare to the fact that other governments might 
operate different policies13.  
• This leads to the fundamental conclusion of this paper which is that if 
governments, who would want R&D investment undertaken if they could 
commit, cannot commit to future environmental  then environmental policies 
alone may no longer be sufficient to induce the optimal R&D investment in 
which case it is always in the interests of such governments to resort to 
technology policy instruments like R&D subsidies. 
                                                                                                                                            
problem.  There is still the commitment problem if there are different governments that will operate 
different policies conditional on learning more about the nature of climate change – its speed and 
potential damage.  
 
12 For example we assume there is a single firm – so there are no spillover or strategic investment 
issues – and that this firm can fully capture all consumer benefits – so there are no undervaluation 
effects. 
13 Put differently lack of commitment increases the incentive of governments to have the investment 
undertaken because it gives the current government some weak control over the tax policies of future 
governments.    
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2.   The Model 
 
As indicated in the introduction we take it that there are a number of key features of 
the problems posed by climate change: 
• there is a sector of the economy - energy/transport - that is largely responsible 
for the production of greenhouse gas emissions; 
• the output of this sector is essential and consumers are reluctant to cut back 
their consumption of the output of this sector; 
• so the major hope of reducing emissions lies in discovering cleaner 
technologies for producing the output of this sector; 
• collectively the sector needs to make a very significant upfront investment in 
R&D to discover, develop and bring to market these new technologies that 
will emit fewer greenhouse gasses; 
• however there is some degree of urgency in doing this, so there is a one-off 
opportunity to make the investment.   
 
We capture these ideas in the following model. There is a single firm which produces 
a commodity the production/consumption of which generates pollution.  So if  
denotes output and  emissions per unit of output, total emissions will be
0x ≥
.0e > E e x= .    
 
There are two periods.  In period 1 the firm decides whether or not to make a fixed 
investment F > 0 in an environmental R&D project the sole benefit of which is to 
produce a cleaner technology.  So if the firm makes the investment emissions per unit 
of output will be , but if it does not make the investment emissions will remain 
at the higher level 
0Le >
H Lee > .   
 
For simplicity we assume that all the consumer benefits and environmental damage 
created by this firm accrue in period 2.  We also assume that any discounting is 
incorporated into the benefit and damage functions discussed below. 
 
The only thing that the firm chooses in period 2 is the amount of output, x.  This 
yields consumer benefits  (net of production costs). We assume that on some 
interval 
( ) 0B x >
)0, x⎡⎣  his benefit function satisfies the standard conditions that 
, where ( ) 0, ( ) 0B x B x′ ′′> < x  is defined by ( ) 0B x′ = .   To capture the idea that 
consumers are reluctant to cut back consumption we make the stronger assumption 
that throughout )0, x⎡⎣  
 
( )( ) 1
( )
xB xx
B x
β ′′≡ − ′ > .      (1) 
 
Later in the paper it will be helpful to focus on the case where β is a constant, not a 
function of x. 
 
For simplicity we will assume that the costs of production are sufficiently low 
(relative to benefits) that they can be ignored.  
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Although we have focused on a single firm, we want to abstract from any competition 
issues arising from the potential exercise of monopoly power by this firm, so we 
assume that the firm can perfectly price discriminate and thus capture the entire 
consumer benefit ( )B x .    
 
The environmental damage created by emissions are captured by the damage cost 
function  which also satisfies the standard conditions that 
. Let  
( ) 0D E >
( ) 0D D E′= >(0) 0, , ( ) 0D E′′ >
 
    . ( )( ) 0
( )
E D EE
D E
δ ′′≡ >′ .    (2) 
 
Once again, later in the paper it will be helpful to focus on the case where δ is a 
constant, not a function of E. 
 
Governments are in power for just a single period and can set policy variables only 
for the period in which they are in power and only in relation to decisions that are 
being made by the private sector in that period. 
 
So there is a government in period 1 which, without loss of generality, we can assume 
attaches a weight 1ω =  to environmental damage costs, relative to the profits / 
consumer surplus generated by output in its social welfare function.  The only 
decision that this period 1 government can influence is whether or not the firm makes 
the investment in R&D, and we assume that the only instrument at its disposal is an 
R&D subsidy which takes the form of a lump-sum payment S .14  
 
The government that is in power in period 2 can influence only the level of output 
chosen by the firm in period 2 which it does through the choice of an emissions tax 
which we assume takes the  form of a simple tax t per unit of emissions.  Notice that 
the value of t chosen by the period 2 government will in principle depend on the 
emissions technology that is being used and hence on the R&D decision made by the 
firm in period 1.   
 
To capture the issue of commitment we allow the possibility that the weight, ω, 
attached to environmental damage by the period 2 government may be different from 
that of the period 1 government – i.e. that 1ω ≠ .  Then we say that governments 
have the ability to commit if the government in period 1 knows for sure that the 
weight given to damage by the period 2 government is also 1ω = .  In this case 
effectively the same government is choosing both the period 1 technology policy and 
the period 2 environmental policy.  We will say that governments do not have the 
ability to commit if the government in period 1 knows that there is a possibility that 
the government in period 2 will put a different weight on environmental damage and 
so may choose tax rates that are different from those that it would have chosen had it 
remained in power.  
 
Notice that the investment decision made by the firm in period 1 will depend on both 
the technology policy chosen by the period 1 government and by the anticipated 
                                                 
14 This will be an R&D tax if  S is negative. 
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environmental policies chosen by the period 2 government, and so will also be 
affected by whether or not the government in period 1 can commit.  Notice also that 
even if the government in period 1 cannot commit and so cannot directly choose the 
environmental policy in period 2, it can still exert some indirect influence over that 
policy through its ability to influence the investment decision in period 1.   
Consequently the questions we are interested in are:  how does the ability of the 
government in period 1 to commit affect  
(i) the investment decision it regards as optimal; 
(ii) the technology policy that it chooses?  
 
 
3.   Analysis of the Model 
 
We undertake the analysis by considering first the decisions of the government and 
firm in period 2 and then working backwards to the decisions of the government and 
firm in period 1. 
 
3.1 Second Period Analysis. 
 
We assume that the second-period government has a weight, ω, on the environment 
and the firm has a technology which emits e units of pollution per unit of output. The 
government wishes the firm to choose the output level that maximizes its (the 
government’s)  objective function.   So let  
 
 ˆ( , ) [ ( ) ( . )]
x
x e ARGMAX B x D e xω ω≡ −                        (3) 
be the optimal output level and  be the associated aggregate level 
of emissions.   The first-order condition for the optimum output is:   
),(ˆ.),(ˆ ωω exeeE =
 
   )),(ˆ.(.),(ˆ( ωωω exeDeexB ′=′ ,          (4) 
 
i.e. Marginal Benefit equals Marginal Damage. 
 
From (1), (2) and (4) we have the following comparative static elasticities for the 
optimal levels of output and emissions:   
           
  
ˆ ˆˆˆ 1 10 1; 1ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
e x e E e x
x e e x eE
δ β
δβ δ β δ
∂ + ∂ ∂ −< − = < = + = >∂ ∂+ +
ˆ
0  (5) 
and 
ˆ ˆ 1 0ˆ ˆˆ
E x
xE
ω ω
ω ω β δ
∂ ∂
ˆ= = − <∂ ∂ +    (6) 
 
where ˆ   and  ˆβ δ  are just the values of the elasticities in (1) and (2) evaluated at the 
optimal levels of output and emissions respectively.   
 
From (5) we see that, given our assumption in (1) that , it follows that having a 
dirtier technology causes governments to cut back output, but less than 
ˆ 1β >
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proportionately, so total emissions increase.  Conversely it is only by moving to a 
cleaner technology that governments can hope to reduce emissions15.  From (6) we 
see that governments that care more about the environment will want to have lower 
levels of output and emissions.  
 
The maximum level of social welfare arising from the optimal choice of output by a 
period 2 government is: 
 
 ( )2ˆ ˆ ˆ( , ) ( ) . ( ( , ) ( . ( , ))
x
W e MAX B x D e x B x e D e x eω ω ω ω⎡ ⎤≡ − ≡ −⎣ ⎦ ω       (7) 
 
It is straightforward to show that: 
 
   
2ˆ ˆˆ( , ) ( , ) 0W x e D E e
e
ω ω ω∂ ⎡ ⎤′− = >⎣ ⎦∂    (8) 
 
    
2ˆ ˆ ( , ) 0W D E e ωω
∂ ⎡ ⎤= − ⎣ ⎦∂ <    (9) 
 
   
2 2ˆ ˆˆ ( , ) . 0W D E e
e e
ωω
∂ ⎡ ⎤′− = >⎣ ⎦∂ ∂ ∂
E∂    (10) 
 
The expression in (8) shows that as long as a government puts a positive weight on 
the environment it will have a positive (marginal) incentive to reduce emissions, 
while (10) shows that the greater is a government’s concern about the environment 
the greater is its (marginal) incentive to reduce emissions.  
 
To induce the profit-motivated firm to choose the optimal output level the second-
period government needs to set the appropriate emission tax.  So let 
 
    ( ) [ ]( )
x
MAX B x xτ τΠ = − ,   (11) 
and 
    %( ) [ ]( )
x
x ARGMAX B x xτ τ= −   (12) 
 
be, respectively, the maximum operating (period 2) profits and the associated profit-
maximising level of output of the firm when it faces any given output tax τ. 
 
The first-order condition associated with (12) is 
 
     ( )B x τ′ =% .    (13) 
 
So from (4) and (13) it follows that to induce the firm to produce output level the 
government sets an emission tax equal to marginal damage – i.e. such that: ),(ˆ ωet
 
                                                 
15 Despite the fact that (5) shows that optimal output will expand – but not by much – through having a 
cleaner technology. 
 9
    ˆˆ( , ) ( , )t e D E eω ω ω⎡ ⎤′= ⎣ ⎦    (14) 
 
with associated optimal output tax 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆˆˆ ˆ, , , ,e et e eD E e B x eτ ω ω ω ω⎡ ⎤′ ′ ω⎡ ⎤= = = ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ .  (15). 
 
From (13) and (15) it is easy to see that 
 
    ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ,x e x e,τ ω⎡ ⎤ =⎣ ⎦% ω .    (16) 
 
From (14), (15), (5) and (6) we can derive the following comparative static elasticities 
of the emissions and output tax rates: 
 
   
ˆˆ ˆˆˆ. 0; 1ˆˆ ˆ
e t e E e e t
t e e t eE e
τδ τ
∂ ∂ ∂ ∂= > = +∂ ∂∂ 1ˆ >∂    (17) 
 
   
ˆˆˆ ˆ ˆ1 ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ
t E
t E
ω ω τ ω βδω τ ω ω β δ
∂ ∂ ∂= = + = >∂ ∂ ∂ + 0 .  (18) 
 
From (17) we see that if the firm introduces a cleaner technology with lower 
emissions per unit of output, then this cause the government to lower the tax rate on 
emissions.  This result follows from the result we established in (5) that total 
emissions will fall with a cleaner technology.  Having a cleaner technology will lower 
the output tax the firm  will face in two ways:   
(i) for a given level of emissions tax it will lower the amount of tax it pays on 
every unit of output;  
(ii) it will induce whatever government it faces to lower the emissions tax.   
As we will see later on, the fact that there are these two ways of lowering the effective 
tax on output that a firm faces has important implications for the design of policy.  
 
Combining (11) and (14) we can define  
     
[ ]ˆ ˆ( , ) ( , )e eω τ ωΠ = Π      (19) 
 
as the operating (period 2) profits the firm will make if it has a technology which 
emits e units of pollution per unit of output and faces a government that puts a weight 
ω on environmental damage.   It is straightforward to show that: 
 
  
ˆ ˆˆˆ ˆ( , ) 0; ( , ) 0x e x e
e e
τω ω ω
∂Π ∂ ∂Π ∂− = > = − <∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
τˆω .  (20) 
 
Thus profits, net of emission taxes, are decreasing in the level of emissions per unit of 
output and in the weight the government places on the environment.  
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Finally we also need to consider the level of welfare that the government in period 116 
derives when it evaluates the implications of the policies it anticipates will be 
implemented in period 2 if the government that is then in power has a weight ω on 
environmental issues, and the firm has a technology with emissions per unit of output 
e.   This is given by 
 
   ( ) [ ] [ ]1 ˆ ˆ, ( , ) ( ,W e B x e D ex e )ω ω= − ω .   (21) 
 
Obviously we have the following link between 1 2ˆ( , )  and  ( , )W e W eω ω : 
 
    .    (22) 1 2ˆ( ,1) ( ,1)W e W e=
 
For later purposes it is useful to notice that, from (6) and (21)  
 
  
( )1 ˆ ˆ( ) .. ( , )
ˆ ˆ
ˆB x eD ex xW eω ω
ω β δ
′ ′⎡ ⎤−∂ ⎣= −∂ +
⎦    (23) 
 
and that   
 
   
1( , ) 0  as  1W e ω ωω
∂ >
∂ < >
< .    (24) 
 
So, not surprisingly, the period 1 government’s welfare is maximized when it 
anticipates that future governments will act like it. 
  
3.2 First Period Analysis. 
 
In the first period the only decision to be made by the firm is whether or not to 
undertake the R&D investment; the only decision to be made by the government is 
whether or not to influence the R&D decision of the firm by taxing or subsidizing 
R&D. We consider these decisions first on the assumption that the government in 
period 1 can commit to emission taxes in period 2, (or, equivalently, that the same 
government is in power in both periods 1 and 2) and then on the assumption that the 
government in period 1 can make no commitment about emission taxes in period 2 
(or, equivalently, that the government in power in period 2 may not be the same as the 
one in period 1). 
 
3.2.1 Commitment. 
 
We determine both the social and the private incentive for the investment to be 
undertaken, and, by comparing the two, determine the optimal policy.  Since this 
paper addresses the question of how the inability of the government to commit might 
affect both its desire to have the investment undertaken, and the policies it might need 
to use to achieve this, we certainly want to assume that, if it can commit, it would 
want the investment to take place. 
 
                                                 
16 For whom, recall, 1ω =  
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The gain in social welfare that the period 1 government anticipates obtaining if it is in 
power in period (2) and the investment is carried  out is given by 
 
   ( ) ( )1 1 1(1) ,1 ,1LW W e W eΔ ≡ − H .   (25) 
 
From (22) we know that  
 
   ( ) ( )1 2 2 2ˆ ˆ ˆ(1) (1) ,1 ,1 0L HW W W e W eΔ ≡ Δ = − >  (26) 
 
which, from (8), we know to be positive.   Consequently the government will want to 
have the investment undertaken if and only if 
 
    .     (27) 2ˆ (1)WΔ > F
 
As indicated above we certainly want to assume that, if it can commit, the government 
wants the investment to be undertaken.  So in everything that follows we assume that 
(27) holds.  
 
Assuming that the firm knows for sure that the period 1 government will be in power 
in period 2 and fully anticipates how the emissions tax it sets will depend on the 
emissions technology that is being used, the private incentive to undertake the 
investment is given by  
     
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1) ,1 ,1 ,1 ,1 0L H L He e e eτ τ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ΔΠ ≡ Π −Π = Π −Π >⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ , (28) 
 
which, from (20)  we know to be positive.   
 
From (7), (11), (15), (19), (25) and (26)  it is easy to see that   
 
  ( ) ( )2ˆ ˆ ˆˆ (1) (1) ,1 ,1HW H E e H E eL⎡ ⎤ ⎡ΔΠ −Δ = − ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
)
  (29)  
where 
   ( ) . ( ) (H E E D E D E′≡ − . 
 
It is easy to see that, given our assumptions about the damage function, H(E) is a 
positive and strictly increasing function, and since, from (5), we know that total 
emissions are increasing in e it follows that  
 
    172ˆˆ (1) (1)WΔΠ > Δ     (30) 
 
and so the firm, anticipating the environmental taxes that will be imposed by the 
government, has a stronger incentive to invest than the government.  The intuition is 
clear.  Because marginal damage is increasing, if firms face taxes that are equal to 
marginal damage then the total tax paid on any level of emissions is greater than the 
costs of damage to society, and, moreover, this difference is greater the higher the 
                                                 
17 Indeed it is easy to see that the above argument establishes the more general result that 
ˆˆ ( ) ( )Wω ω ωΔΠ > Δ ∀  
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level of emissions.  So firms have more powerful incentives to reduce emissions than 
does society. 
 
It therefore follows from (27) that ˆ (1) FΔΠ > , and so we have established  
 
Proposition 1  If the government in period 1 can commit to environmental taxes in 
period 2, then environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce the optimal 
investment decision. 
 
This is just a restatement of the conventional wisdom of environmental economics.   
 
Now notice that from (15) and (27) we can re-write 
 
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ(1) L L H L H L H He t e e t e e t e e t e⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ΔΠ = Π −Π + Π −Π⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎤⎦ . (31) 
 
Given that profits are a decreasing function of the tax rate, both terms on the RHS of 
(31) are positive.  The first is the increase in profits the firm would get from 
undertaking the investment if the government announced just a single environmental 
tax rate – that which it would impose if the investment were made.  The second term 
is the increase in profits that the firm faces from the threat of the government to set a 
higher tax if the firm fails to undertake the investment.  So we have: 
 
Corollary 1    (i)  If  ( ) ( )ˆ ˆL L H Le t e e t e F⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Π −Π⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ≥  then the government can induce 
the optimal investment by committing to a tax rate – that which it would impose if the 
investment were undertaken. 
(ii) If  ( ) ( )ˆ ˆL L H Le t e e t e F⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Π −Π⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ <  then to induce the optimal investment the 
government in period 1 has to commit to a tax policy which shows how the taxes it 
will set will vary with the investment decisions of firms.  In particular it has to 
commit to setting higher taxes if firms fail to invest. 
 
Since much of the literature on environmental policy focuses on marginal investment 
decisions, it is often assumed that it is sufficient to commit to future tax rates.  This 
corollary suggests that governments may need a stronger degree of commitment to 
induce very significant investments.  
 
3.2.2  No Commitment.  
 
We begin by establishing the incentives of the government and the firm to invest if 
they knew for sure that the government in power in period 2 had a weight 0ω ≥  on 
environmental damage, and the consequent implications for policy.  We will then 
discuss how the analysis goes through when there is uncertainty about the possible 
future government.  
 
3.2.2.1    The Case of Certainty 
 
The incentive of the government to invest is given by 
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 ( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1,LW W e W e ,Hω ωΔ = − ω    (32) 
 
while that of the firm is 
 
           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) , , , , 0L H L He e e eω ω ω τ ω τ ω⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ΔΠ ≡ Π −Π = Π −Π ≥⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . (33) 
 
Now we know from (21), (25), (26), (27), (32) and (33) that when 1ω =  then 
 
 ,   (34) 1 2ˆˆ (1) (1) (1)W WΠ > Δ = Δ > F
 
while from (24) it follows that 
 
   
1(1) 0Wω
∂Δ =∂ .    (35) 
 
Notice next that if 0ω =  then, from (14) and (15)  ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ,0 ,0 0L He eτ τ= = , which, 
from (16), implies ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ,0 ,0 (0)L Hx e x e x= = =% x , so we have,  
 
                          ( ) [ ] [ ]1 ˆ0 H LW D e x D e xΔ = − > = ΔΠ0 (0)    (36) 
 
so when 0ω =  the social incentive to invest is greater than the private incentive, 
which is zero and so certainly less than F. 
 
We want to compare the incentive to invest by the government in period 1 if it 
anticipates there being a government in period 2 which attaches no weight to the 
environment, with the incentive to invest if it itself were in power.  It is 
straightforward to show that 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( ){ }
( ) ( ){ } ( ) ( ){ }
1 1 ˆ ˆ(0) (1) 1, 1,
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ1, 1, 1, 1,
H L H H L H
L H L L L H
W W D e x D e x D e x e D e x e
B x e B x e D e x e D e x e
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Δ − Δ = − − −⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤− − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (37) 
 
 
The first term is positive and shows that there will be a greater reduction in damage 
brought about by having the new technology when we evaluate this at the level of 
output that would arise if the government took no action compared to the much lower 
level of output that would prevail if the firm failed to invest and the period-1 
government imposed its desired emissions/output tax.  The second term is negative 
and shows that, compared to the situation where the period-2 government put no 
weight on the environment, one of the benefits that would arise were the period-1 
government in power in period 2 would be that output would be higher if firms 
undertook the investment.  However the final term is positive reflecting the fact that, 
conditional on the firm using the cleaner technology,  this latter factor carries the 
downside of higher emissions.  
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In what follows we assume that x  is sufficiently large that the first term in (37) 
dominates and consequently we have:. 
 
                (38) ( )1 1 2ˆ0 (1) (1)W W WΔ > Δ = Δ > F
 
where the last inequality follows from (26).   
 
So, from (36) and (38) we have established 
 
Proposition 2   If the level of output that is chosen by a government in period 2 that 
attached no weight to the environment is sufficiently high, then the incentive of the 
period 1 government to have the investment undertaken would be higher than if it 
itself were in power in period 2, while the private incentives of the firm to invest will 
be zero. 
 
We now make the stronger assumption that the elasticities  and  β δ  are constant. 
 
It is straightforward to show from (23)  that  
 
               
( ) ( )1
0
. .. ( ) 0L L H H
e x D e x e x D e xW
ω
ω ω
ω β δ=
′ ′⎡ ⎤ ⎡−∂ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣= <∂ +
⎤⎦   (39) 
 
so  1( )W ωΔ  is strictly decreasing at 0ω = . 
 
In addition, from (18) it follows that for all 0ω ≥  
 
 %( )( ) ( ) %( )( ) ( ){ }ˆ ( ) ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ, . , , . ,H H L Lx e e x e eω ω β τ ω τ ω τ ω τ ωω β δ∂Π ⎡ ⎤ ⎡= −⎣ ⎦ ⎣∂ + 0⎤ >⎦   (40) 
 
where the inequality follows from the fact that although the higher output tax when 
the firm fails to invest lowers output, because 1β >  output falls less than 
proportionately causing tax revenue to increase. 
 
This is as far as we have been able to push the analysis at a high level of generality.  
To understand what happens to the functions ( )1 ˆ and  ( )W ω ωΔ ΔΠ  for values of ω 
other than 0 and 1, we have derived these two functions explicitly for the case where 
the two  
elasticities   and  β δ  are constant.18   Details are given in Appendix 1, and the 
resulting functions are illustrated in Figure 1 which is presented in Appendix 2.   
 
The key features are  
                                                 
18 One implication of assuming constant elasticities for all values of x and E is that x = ∞  and so the 
inequality in (37) holds for sure.  But as we have shown this inequality will hold under a far wider 
range of cases. 
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• the social incentive to invest takes a minimum at 1ω =  and is convex over an 
interval 0,ω⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  where 1ω >  
• the private incentive to invest is zero when 0ω = , strictly increasing and 
concave.   
 
The intuition behind the first result is that the lower are emissions per unit of output 
the less sensitive is the welfare of the period-1 government to the type of government 
that is in power in period 2, so it sees a greater incentive to have the cleaner 
technology in place precisely when it contemplates the possibility of a different type 
of government’s being in power.    
 
The second conclusion follows because although emission/output taxes increase as the 
weight placed on environmental damage increases, they do so at a decreasing 
marginal rate – precisely because the firms responds by cutting back output.  This 
introduces an intrinsic degree of effective risk aversion to the investment decision.    
 
In the light of the second of the above two conclusions, we can now define ω  as the 
critical minimal weight placed on the environment by the period 2 government above 
which the private incentive of the firm to invest exceeds F .   
 
So we have the following 
 
Proposition 3(i)  Whatever type of government is in power in period 2, the 
government in period 1 will always want the investment to be undertaken 
3 (ii)    If  ω ω≥  then the firm will choose to invest and, once again, environmental 
policies alone are sufficient to induce the optimal investment.  However if ω ω<   
then the use of environmental policies alone will not be sufficient to bring about the 
optimal investment and it will be necessary for the period-1 government to introduce 
an R&D subsidy to induce what it regards as the socially optimal investment. 
 
Now let us turn to the case of uncertainty. 
 
3.2.2.1  The Case of  Uncertainty 
  
Now suppose that the firm and the government are unsure what type of government 
will be in power in period 2 but share a common belief that ω is distributed with 
positive support on the real line19 according to the probability density function 
( ) 0f ω >  where   
 
  ( )
0
( ) 1E f dω ω ω ω∞= =∫ .   (40) 
 
Given the properties of ( )1 ˆ and  ( )W ω ωΔ Π
                                                
 we have 
 
 
19 If the distribution had positive support only for values of ω ω>  then there once again 
environmental policies alone will be sufficient to achieve the optimum investment. 
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                    (41) 1 1
0
ˆ( ) ( ) (1) (1)W f d W Wω ω ω∞Δ > Δ = Δ∫ 2 F>
ˆ
and 
 .   (42) ( )
0
ˆ ( ) ( ) 1f dω ω ω∞ΔΠ < ΔΠ∫
 
Given (26) and (29) it will only be if there is a sufficiently great degree of uncertainty 
with high probablities that ω ω<   that it is likely that 
0
ˆ ( ) ( )f dω ω ω∞ FΔΠ <∫ .  
 
So we have: 
 
Proposition 4 (i)   Whatever the distribution of possible types of period-2 
governments, the period-1 government will always want to have the investment 
undertaken. 
4 (ii)  If the degree of uncertainty is particularly large – in particular if there is a 
significant risk of having governments with  ω ω<  - then environmental policies 
alone may not be sufficient to induce the optimal investment and the period-1 
government will need to resort to an R&D subsidy. 
 
4.   Conclusions 
 
We have shown that the inability of governments to commit to policies into the future 
has significant implications for the optimal set of policies, and calls into question the 
traditional prescription that environmental policies alone are sufficient to induce both 
the optimal output and the optimal investment.  This is because the inability to 
commit has very different effects on the incentives of both governments and the 
private sector to have cleaner technologies introduced.  It makes the government more 
determined to have the investment carried out but reduces the private incentive to 
invest because it introduces an intrinsic element of risk aversion to the investment 
incentive.  
 
In demonstrating this result we have employed a very simple model which ignores 
many other features of climate change policy-making:  
• the need to reach international agreement,  
• the stock-externality problem and the optimal time-path of emission taxes; 
• he fact that there I still considerable uncertainty about the climate change 
process and its likely effects, but there is learning taking place. 
 
Each of these can introduce additional features that not only interact with the 
commitment issue but also give rise to their own commitment issues.  For example it 
is interesting to ask how the framework can be applied in the context where there is 
uncertainty about whether and when an international agreement might be reached.  So 
there is scope for considerable further research on this topic. 
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Appendix 1 
 
In this appendix we set out the results for a special case of our model in which the 
elasticity of the marginal benefit function, )(xβ , and the elasticity of the marginal 
damage cost function, )(Eδ , are both constant. Thus we assume that the benefit 
function takes the form: 
1
0 0( ) , , 0, 1(1 )
BB x B x B Bβ ββ
−≡ + > >−   
where 
)(
)(
xB
xBx
′
′′−=β  is the constant elasticity of marginal  and 0B  is assumed to be 
sufficiently large that  for all relevant values of x.    ( ) 0B x ?
 
The damage cost function is assumed to take the form: 
 
(1 )
( ) , 0
(1 )
ED E
δ
δδ
+
≡ + >    
where 
)(
)(
ED
EDE
′
′′=δ  is the constant elasticity of marginal damage. 
 
We first analyse the environmental taxes the first-period government would set in the 
second-period if it had the powers to commit to these taxes. 
 
 A1. Second Period Policy When First-Period Government Can Commit. 
 
Suppose in the second period the level of emissions per unit of output is given by e. 
Then it is straightforward to show that the optimal output that would be chosen by the 
period-1 government is given by: 
   
1 1
ˆ( ,1) .x e B e
δ
β δ β δ
+−+ += ;    (A1) 
 
the corresponding optimal level of emissions is given by: 
 
   
1 1
ˆ ˆ( ,1) . ( ,1) .E e e x e B e
β
β δ β δ
−
+ += = ;  (A2) 
 
the emission tax required to induce the firm to set the optimal output is: 
 
   
( 1)
ˆ( ,1) .t e B e
δ δ β
β δ β δ
−
+ += .    (A3) 
 
For later purposes it is useful to note that, by multiplying (A2) and (A3) the tax 
revenue raised in this situation is: 
 
   
(1 )( 1)1
( )ˆ ( ,1)R e B e
δ βδ
β δβ δ
+ −+
++= ,   (A4) 
 
which is a strictly increasing function of e  and that total environmental damages are   
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ˆ ( ,1)ˆ ( ,1) .
1
R eD e δ= +     (A5) 
 
Government welfare is  
 
   2 0
ˆ( ) ( ,ˆ ( ,1)
( 1)(1 )
1)R eW e B β δβ δ
+= − − +    (A6) 
 
while the firm’s profits are given by: 
 
   0
ˆ ( ,1)ˆ ( ,1)
1
R ee B ββΠ = − − .   (A7) 
 
Comparing (A4) and (A5c) it is straightforward to see that ˆ ˆ( ,1) ( ,1)R e D e> , so, as 
would be expected, tax revenue exceeds total damage costs,  while comparing (A6) 
and (A7) confirms that government welfare exceeds profits, precisely because tax 
revenues exceed total damage costs.  This just exemplifies for this special case the 
very general analysis underlying the conclusion in equation (29) in the main text.   
 
A2. Second Period Policy When First-Period Government Cannot Commit. 
 
We now suppose that in the second period the government in power has an objective 
function which attaches a weight ω to damage costs. Then it is straightforward to 
obtain the following results:    
  
   
1
ˆ( , ) ( ,1)ˆx e xβ δω ω− += e ;   (A8) 
and 
   ˆ( , ) ( ,1)t e t e
β
β δω ω += ˆ ;    (A9) 
 
from which it follows  that: 
  
1
1
2
0
ˆ( ) ( ,ˆ ( , )
( 1)(1 )
1)R eW e B
β
δβ δ ωω β δ
−
++= − − + ;   (A10) 
  
1
0
ˆ ( ,1)ˆ ( , )
1
R ee B
β
β δβωω β
−
+
Π = − −     (A11) 
and 
  
1 1
1
0
ˆ( , ) ( ,1)
1 1
W e B R e
β δ
β δ β δω ωω β δ
− +−+ +⎡ ⎤⎢ ⎥= − +⎢ ⎥− +⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
.  (A12) 
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From A(10) and A(12) it is straightforward to confirm the general result in equation 
(22) in the main text , namely  1 2ˆ( ,1) ( ,1)W e W e=
 
A3. First-Period Investment Decision. 
 
We want to compare the incentives of the period-1 government to invest with those of 
the private firm.   From (A11) and (A12) we get:   
 
  ,  (A13) 1 1 1 ˆ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )L hW W e W eω ω ω ψ ωΔ = − = RΔ
R
and  
  
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( , ) ( , ) ( )L He eω ω ω η ωΔΠ = Π −Π = Δ ,  (A14) 
where   
( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ,1 ,1 0H LR R e R eΔ ≡ − >  ,   (A15) 
 
   
1 1
( )
1 1
β δ
β δ β δω ωψ ω β δ
− +−+ +
≡ +− + ,   (A16) 
and 
    
1
)(
1
−≡
+
−
β
βωωη δβ
β
.   (A17) 
 
These satisfy the following properties: 
 
[ ]
1 2
1 3 2
2
0 ( ) ;
>( ) ( 1),   so  ( ) 0  as  1;
<
< 1 2( ) (1 2 ) (1 ) ,   so  ( ) 0 as 1
( ) > 1
δ β
β δ
δ β
β δ
ω ψ ω
ωψ ω ω ψ ω ωβ δ
ω δ βψ ω δ β δ ω ψ ω ω ωβ δ δ
+ +− +
+ +− +
→ ⇒ →∞
<′ ′= −+ >
< + +′′ ′′= + + − + ≡+ > >+
  
 
and 
 
 
 
 
0
)(
)1()(;0)(;0)0(
21
2
1
<+
+−=′′>+=′=
+
++−+
+− δβ
δβ
δβ
δ
ωδβ
δβωηωδβ
βωηη    
 
So  )(ωψ  
• tends to infinity as ω tends to zero;  
• is a decreasing strictly convex function of ω for ω less than 1; 
• reaches a minimum when ω =1; 
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• is an increasing convex function of ω for ω between 1 and ω >1; 
• and an increasing but concave function of ω for ω ω≥ .  
 
While )(ωη   
• is zero when ω is zero; 
• for all non-negative values of ω is an increasing and strictly concave function. 
 
These properties are precisely what are illustrated in Figure 1 in Appendix 2. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
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